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Since the daring attempt in 1985 by Turner Broadcasting 
System to capture CBS,' there has not been a more exciting con- 
test of media giants than the recent one between Time, Inc. 
("Time") and Paramount Communications, Inc.= The contest is 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University; J.D. 1980, Georgetown Univer- 
sity Law Center; B.S. 1976, Towson State University. 
1. "CBS" is the acronym for Columbia Broadcasting Systems, a television net- 
work and a licensee of radio and television stations. 
2. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 @el. 1989). 
Over the years, in addition to its magazines (Time, People, Sports Illustrated), Time 
has dabbled in newspapers, movie production, forest products and TV stations. 
At the time of the contest, Time also owned substantial cable interests-Ameri- 
can Television & Communications Corporation, HBO and Cinemax. In addition, 
Warner Communications, Inc. ("Warner") and Time held significant ownership posi- 
tions in Turner Broadcasting (which owns Cable News Network ("CNN"), Supersta- 
tion WTBS, a broadcast licensee, and Turner Network Television) and together would 
control 17% of Turner. Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee Warner Communi- 
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famous not simply for the shrewd takeover strategies employed 
(both offensively and defensively) but also for the novel, yet 
bold, grounds asserted by Time in defense against the takeover. 
Time's board of directors proclaimed its duty and privilege to 
fend off Paramount to protect the "Time CultureM-this notion 
that Time had become recognized in this country as an institu- 
tion built upon a foundation of journalistic integrity.3 
The full import of the "Time Culture" is not clear. It may 
mean nothing more than a belief that high quality work will en- 
gender audience loyalty and, therefore, continued financial suc- 
cess. On the other hand, the "Time Culture" may be a 
recognition by the board of directors of additional, societal re- 
<< sponsibilities owed by an influential media corporation- an en- 
terprise operated in the public intere~t."~ 
The Federal Communications Act 1934, ("the Act")= re- 
quires licensees and franchisees to serve the '"ublic interest, 
convenience and necessity" in exchange for the privilege of using 
the broadcast spect~um.~ The fact that many such operators, 
like those controlled by Time, are organized as corporations may 
seem to create a conflict, because, traditionally, the business cor- 
poration's only legitimate interest is the '%business interest" of 
making a profit.' While the traditional view has changed some- 
cations, Inc. at 5, Paramount Communications, Inc, 571 A.2d 1140 (No. 279). 
Warner also owned, among other things, a major film studio and had begun to expand 
into the business of television program production-having just entered into a merger 
agreement to acquire Lorimar Telepictures, an important producer of television pro- 
grams. Brief of Defendant Warner Communications, Inc. in Opposition to Motions 
for a Preliminary Injunction at 17, 571 A.2d 1140 (C.A. No. 10,670). 
3. Time Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 15-16, Paramount Communications, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (C.A. No. 
10,670). These "same tenets" of Time's corporate culture "have been extended to the 
rest of T i e ,  Inc.'s book business" and the "same philosophy pervades . . . [the] cable 
business." Id. at 16 n.7. 
4. Id. at 34 (statement of Henry Luce, 111, Outside Director, Time). Of course, 
as to its magazine operations, Time always has been free to ignore any non-traditional 
business concern in its editorial decisions. Indeed, to ensure that the editorial side of 
the company would operate free from intrusion by the business side, the company 
separated these functions by creating a "church-state" structure. Id. at 16. 
5. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. $5 151-612 (1988). 
6. Id. 5 309(a) (1988). 
7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668,684 (1919) ("A 
business corporation is organized and camed on primarily for the profit of the stock- . 
holders"); see also Green, Corporate Philanthropy and the Business Benefi: The Need 
for Clarity, 20 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 239 (1990) (even though many corporations 
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what,8 corporate directors must still have profitability as their 
central focus. At the same time, by the language of the Act, 
corporate broadcast licensees have additional and special obliga- 
tions. They must also serve the "public interest." 
While the notion of the "Time Cultureyy is discussed in de- 
tail below, by way of introduction, a few questions seem perti- 
nent. If the "Time Culture" means that a media corporation 
may have additional societal responsibilities, this raises sign& 
cant corporate law issues: when are directors of business corpo- 
rations, in particular media corporations, permitted to consider 
any object other than shareholder wealth maximization? Should 
the range of legitimate factors for decisionmaking be broader for 
media corporations, particularly those regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")? If 
so, and these corporations must consider the public interest, 
how does the corporate broadcaster discover and satisfy it, and 
how should a corporation reconcile the conflict between maxi- 
mizing profits and serving the public interest? When will a 
choice in favor of the public interest be upheld under traditional 
corporation doctrine? 
Part I of this essay discusses the "public interest" standard 
under the Federal Fommunications Act and describes parallels 
in corporation doctrine. Part I1 considers whether broadcasters 
satisfy their public interest obligations by addressing audience 
interest. Part I11 discusses the prerogatives of the management 
do engage in philanthropic activities, their primary motivation may be long run em- 
nomic benefit). 
8. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586 
("Modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social, as 
well as private, responsibilities as members of the communities within which they op- 
erate"), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). 
The American Law Institute has suggested that: 
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business 
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain, 
except that, whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are thereby 
enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . . 
. . . . 
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably re- 
garded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business. . . . 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 2.10 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). In the 
Comment to this section, the ALI explains that the "ethical considerations" referred 
to include "an orientation toward lawful, ethical, and public-spirited activity." Id. at 
comment f. 
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of the corporate broadcaster to consider non-financial factors in 
selecting programming. Part IV describes the non-traditional 
philosophy of the corporation's legitimate object, which led to 
the subject case. Part V discusses the central legal issues of the 
cognizable business interests of corporations. Finally, the Con- 
clusion offers a view on desirable public interest objectives of me- 
dia corporations. 
I. "PUBLIC INTEREST" UNDER T H E  FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
"[P]ublic interest, convenience and necessity" are not de- 
fined in the Act9 and courts and the commission have labored 
since its passage to determine what Congress meant by these 
words. The language of the Act gives the Commission no spe- 
cific supervisory control of programs, business management, or 
policy. Yet in the fifty years following its enactment, the Com- 
mission has adopted rules and policies to do just that, determin- 
ing that the public interest required them.1° For example, the 
9. The Act does authorize the Commission, in furtherance of these ends, to 
"study new uses for radio . . . and generally encourage the larger and more effective 
use of radio." 47 U.S.C. $ 303(g) (1988). The Act also requires the FCC to provide a 
"fair, efficient and equitable distribution of radio service." Id. at 5 307@) (1988). 
10. Indeed, this theory of regulation began under the Act's predecessor, the Fed- 
eral Radio Act of 1927. The Federal Radio Commission, created by the Radio Act of 
1927, required licensees to: file program schedules; explain how the operation of the 
station would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity; and state the aver- 
age amount of time weekly devoted to entertainment, religious, commercial, educa- 
tional, agricultural and fraternal programs. The Federal Radio Commission further 
decided that well-rounded program service should include "entertainment, religion, 
education, and instruction, important public events, discussion of public questions, 
weather, market reports, and news and matters of interest to all members of the fam- 
ily." F. KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 150-51 (3d ed. 1978) 
(providing a thorough discussion of the history of the Federal Radio Commission's 
regulatory theory). See also Note, Changing Channels in Broadcast Regulation: Leav- 
ing Television Advertising to Containment by Market Forces, 34 CASE W .  RES. 465 
(1984) (discussing history of FCC regulatory theory as part of an analysis of recent 
changes in the theories currently espoused by the FCC); FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RE- 
SPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946) (the "Blue Book"). 
Later, the FCC developed a framework for the comparative evaluation of broad- 
cast applicants in Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 
393, 5 R.R.2d 1901 (1965). There, the Commission enunciated two primary objec- 
tives-to provide: (1) the best practicable service to the public; and (2) diversification 
of control of the mass communications media. In implementing these objectives, the 
FCC deemed important the full-time owner participation in station operations and 
considered the past broadcast record of applicants and their moral character. Id. at 
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Commission at one time determined that it was in the public 
interest to require licensees to ascertain community issues and 
offer programming addressing those needs. It was determined 
to be in the public interest to limit the number of commercials 
aired during children's programs.12 In addition, the Cornmis- 
-- 
395, 5 R.R.2d at 1904. The FCC considered the proposed program service most im- 
portant, and required that an "applicant have the responsibility for a reasonable 
knowledge of the community and area, based on surveys or background, which will 
show that the program proposals are designed to meet the needs and interests of the 
public in that area." Id. at 397, 5 R.R.2d at 1905. 
To ensure attention to the needs of minority populations, the FCC also required 
licensees to adopt equal employment opportunity programs. 47 C.F.R. 3 73.2080 
(1990). 
11. Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 20 R.R. 
1901 (1960) (en banc); see also Community Problems-Broadcast Applicants, 27 
F.C.C.2d 650,21 R.R.2d 1507 (1971) (setting forth guidelines for broadcast applicants 
in ascertaining community problems). The FCC required all applicants for new 
broadcast stations, modification of existing facilities and renewals to determine the 
economic, ethnic and social composition of the communities they proposed to serve 
and to consult with leaders from each significant community group to ascertain the 
programming needs and interests of the entire community. The FCC then required 
the applicant to set forth in its license application specific program proposals designed 
to meet the identified community needs. A licensee that failed to properly address 
these needs risked non-renewal. Alabama Educ. Television Cornm'n ("AETC"), 50 
F.C.C.2d 461, 32 R.R.2d 539 (1975). 
In denying renewal in Alabama Educational Television Commission, the FCC 
found that "blacks rarely appeared on AETC programs; that no black instructors 
were employed in connection with locally-produced in-school programs; and that un- 
explained decisions or inconsistently applied policies forced the preemption of almost 
all black-oriented network programming." Id. at 469, 32 R.R.2d at 556. The FCC 
ruled that the AETC "followed a racially discriminatory policy in its overall program- 
ming practices and, by reason of its pervasive neglect of a black minority consisting of 
approximately 30 percent of the population of Alabama, its programming did not 
adequately meet the needs of the public it was licensed to serve." Id. at 477, 32 
R.R.2d at 555. The FCC went on to say that a licensee "cannot with impunity ignore 
the problems of significant minorities in its service area." Id. at 473, 32 R.R.2d at 
551. 
12. Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 11, 31 R.R.2d 1228, 1240 
(1974), a r d ,  564 F.2d 458 @.C. Cir. 1977). The FCC had strived to ensure that 
children's television programming and advertising reflected the "high public interest 
considerations involved in the use of television, perhaps the most powerful communi- 
cations medium ever devised, in relation to a large and important segment of the audi- 
ence, the nation's children." Children's Programs, 28 F.C.C.2d 368, 369-70 (1971). 
In Action for Children's Television, the FCC concluded that: (1) because of their youth 
and inexperience, "children are far more trusting of and vulnerable to commercial 
'pitches' than adults"; and (2) "very young children cannot distinguish conceptually 
between programming and advertising." 50 F.C.C.2d at 11, 31 R.R.2d at 1240. 
The FCC declined to adopt specific guidelines on the permissible level of advertis- 
ing in children's programming. However, the FCC endorsed the restrictions adopted 
by the industry-that there should be no more than nine and a half minutes per hour 
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sion determined and the Supreme Court agreed that the public 
interest required licensees to air issues that "are so critical and of 
such great importance that it would be unreasonable for a licen- 
see to ignore completely" and also to require that if a broad- 
caster covered a "controversial issue of public importance, it was 
required to take steps to assure that significant contrasting views 
are also presented": the Fairness Doctrine.13 
But the sway of the Commission on its notion of the public 
interest proved as variable as the political winds. The Fairness 
Doctrine is a case in point. In 1970, the Commission described 
the Fairness Doctrine "as the single most important requirement 
of the operation in the public interest - the sine qua non for the 
grant of a renewal of license."14 In 1985, after fifty years of such 
lofty pronouncements, the Commission discovered that the doc- 
trine no longer encouraged the airing of controversial and op- 
posing ideas (which surely serves the public interest) but indeed 
worked to inhibit the communication of ideas.15 The Commis- 
on weekdays and twelve minutes per hour on weekends devoted to non-program mate- 
rial, and that broadcasters should strictly maintain adequate separation between pro- 
gram content and commercial messages. The FCC stated that compliance with the 
industry guidelines would be sufficient to resolve in favor of the station any questions 
as to whether its commercial practices serve the public interest, and licensees who 
exceed these levels should be prepared to justify their advertising policy. Id. at 14, 31 
R.R.2d at 1242. 
In November 1990, President Bush signed into law The Children's Television Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990). Among other things, this Act 
limits commercials during children's television programs to no more than 12 minutes 
per hour on weekdays and 10 and a half minutes on weekends. 
13. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). As for cable television, the Act establishes procedures 
and standards which "assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and inter- 
ests of the local community." 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1988). 
14. Fairness Doctrine Ruling, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 292, 19 R.R.2d 1103, 1111 
(1970). 
15. Fairness Doctrine, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 58 R.R.2d 1137 (1985). To the ques- 
tion of how the expression of ideas is suppressed if broadcasters are required to offer 
discussion of important issues, the broadcasters countered with the argument (perhaps 
more ingenious than convincing) that, in order to avoid the economic burdens of hav- 
ing to make available free air time for the other side of a controversial issue, they 
would avoid the airing of important issues in the first place. This liberal reading of the 
Fairness Doctrine would allow broadcasters to impose their economic interests in 
place of the "public interest" under the Act. However, this argument runs contrary to 
the Supreme Court's view that "[ilt is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
396 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Also, this argument depends upon a more flexible interpre- 
tation of the first prong of the Fairness Doctrine than the language suggests. 
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sion repealed the Fairness Doctrine and, with the deregulation 
of broadcasting generally (including those provisions eliminating 
ascertainment requirements, lifting restrictions on commercials, 
and dropping guidelines for public service, news and non-en- 
tertainment programs16), no longer would a broadcaster need to 
be concerned about societal or community issues.'' In accord- 
ance with Commission regulations, the only forces that re- 
mained to move broadcasters were market forces.18 
This idea that those receiving special privileges from gov- 
ernment should in some way serve the public interest also de- 
scribes early corporate law.19 Professor Hurst teaches that the 
granting of special privileges, such as to "establish rights of way 
and charge tolls or to issue banknotes or to exercise the power of 
eminent domain" (the usual work of the early corporations) 
were "reconciled with our egalitarian conscience, first, by insist- ' 
ing that government's action . . . be legitimated by determining 
that it was in the public interest to confer special privileges to 
obtain services for public convenience or necessity."20 Further, 
the government attached limiting standards or rules to the spe- 
cial privileges to protect those who would become dependent on 
the fairness and quality of the service the corporation would pro- 
16. Commercial TV Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 56 R.R.2d 1005 (1984); Deregu- 
lation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49 R.R.2d 1 (1981). After court challenges, the 
FCC modified its position to require licensees to maintain a list of programs that have 
provided the station's most significant treatment of community issues during the pre- 
ceding three-month period. However, there are no specific, affirmative requirements 
to offer any such programs. Deregulation of Radio, 104 F.C.C.2d 505, 507, 60 
R.R.2d 789, 790 (1986). 
17. See Simon Geller, 102 F.C.C.2d 1443, 59 R.R.2d 579 (1985) (FCC renewed 
license when licensee had presented no programming whatsoever on community is- 
sues). A broadcaster who has failed to deliver any non-entertainment programming, 
though, risks losing a "renewal expectancy." A renewal expectancy is a preference 
given to an incumbent licensee who demonstrates that its past program service has 
been meritorious in meeting the needs and interests of listeners or viewers in its license 
or service area. The value of the preference will vary depending upon the licensee's 
record and even may be decisive where the licensee's past record is found to be "supe- 
rior," such as where there has been an unusually high attention to community needs 
and interests. Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506 @.C. Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). 
18. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 
TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982) (arguing that the FCC should amend its model of broadcast 
regulation to account for market forces). 
19. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION I  THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970, at 60 (1970). 
20. Id. 
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vide.21 Since important special-action franchises were stated in 
corporate charters, it seemed natural to enforce responsibility 
upon these corporations by regulating their business organiza- 
tions, as well as their business.22 Hurst explains that "[bly the 
mid-nineteenth century various regulatory provisions, such as 
limits on capitalization . . . became common in special corporate 
charters."23 Not until the great momentum of the industrial 
revolution did states loosen their hold upon the activities of busi- 
ness corporations on the view that the "corporate instrument 
was so useful for desired economic growth as to warrant using 
law to make it available on terms most responsive to business- 
men's needs or 
The mid-nineteenth century liberalization of corporation 
statutes with the consequent privatization of corporate affairs 
fostered the view that corporations had no public semice obliga- 
tions. Soon it became the dominant theory that any objective 
other than to maximize shareholder wealth was ultra vim ("be- 
yond powers") and therefore 
However, nearly a century later, corporate law scholars and 
legislators were no less reluctant than the Commission to rethink 
the concept of the corporation in light of economic, political and 
historical developments. They seem willing to afford directors 
discretion to expand the range of permissible considerations in 
corporate decisionmaking. Arguably, the circle is complete with 
the enactment of statutes permitting directors to consider groups 
other than shareholders, such as employees, suppliers and the 
community in making business decisions.26 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 60-61. Restrictions also were imposed on corporate size and scope of 
activity. Id. at 61. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 62; see also Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business 
Corporation, 52 BUS. H~sr .  REV. 30 (1978) (noting that the test of importance to the 
general welfare, originally confined to municipal or benevolent enterprises, was being 
applied to manufacturing ventures by the second decade of the nineteenth century). 
25. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459,507, 170 N.W. 668,684; J. H u m ,  
supra note 19, at 69-71. 
26. For example, the Massachusetts business corporation statute provides: 
In determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation, a director may consider the interests of the corporation's em- 
ployees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the state, region 
and nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term and 
short-term interests of the corporation and its stockholders, including the 
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11. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND AUDIENCE INTEREST 
While the deregulation of radio and television removed 
many burdens from broadcasters (largely leaving market forces 
to determine the program policies), a few restrictions were re- 
tained. Some of these remaining regulations reflect the belief 
that the public interest is served by forbidding certain kinds of 
broadcasts because they threaten audiences with undesirable and 
harmful ideas and values. This public interest, thus, demands 
that radio and television not broadcast indecent or obscene ma- 
te~- ia l ,~~ distortion of the n e ~ ~ , ~ *  advertisements of lottery infor- 
m a t i ~ n ~ ~  or cigarette co~nmercials.~~ 
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued indepen- 
dence of the corporation. 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, 5 65 (1990). Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt a 
statute that specifically authorized directors to consider the interests of groups other 
than shareholders in making decisions. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 1721(c) (Purdon 
1990). Since then, many other states have enacted similar laws. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 5 10-1202 (1989), CONN. GEN. STAT. 33-313(e) (1990), FLA. STAT. 
5 607.0830(3) (1989), GA. CODE ANN. 8 14-2-202@)(5) (1990), HAW. REV. STAT. 
415-35@) (1990), IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1602, 30-1702 (1990), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990), IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 
1989), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 271B.12-210 (MichieA3obbs-Merrill 1990), ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A 5 716 (1989), MINN. STAT. 5 302A.251 (1990), NEB. REV. 
STAT. 21-2035 (1989), N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 53-11-35 (1978 & Supp. 1989), N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW 717 (Consol. 1991), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 1701.59@) (Bald- 
win 1990), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1990). 
27. Under federal law, it is unlawful to broadcast obscene or indecent matter. 18 
U.S.C. 5 1464 (1988). In April 1987, the FCC issued new indecency standards which 
prohibited the broadcast of indecent matter during hours when there is a reasonable 
risk that the audience may consist of children. New Indecency Enforcement Stan- 
dards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 FCC Rcd 2726 
(1987). Broadcasters challenged these standards on vagueness grounds. Action for 
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The D.C. Circuit 
Court remanded the case with the direction that the FCC adopt a workable definition 
of indecency, as well as a safe harbor for airing such programs. 
In 1988, Congress passed a requirement that the FCC enforce its anti-indecency 
policy 24 hours a day. The FCC adopted such a policy but was precluded from en- 
forcing it by a stay issued by the D.C. Court of Appeals. Action for Children's Televi- 
sion v. FCC, No. 1916, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1989). 
In the area of cable television, see 47 U.S.C. 559 (1988) (providing sanctions for 
the transmission "over any cable system [of3 any matter which is obscene or otherwise 
unprotected by the Constitution") and 47 U.S.C. 5 544(d)(l) (1988) (authorizing 
franchising authorities to prohibit and/or regulate obscene or otherwise unprotected 
communications). 
28. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
29. 18 U.S.C. 5 1304 (1988). 
30. 15 U.S.C. 1335 (1988). 
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These limited restrictions seem to leave many programming 
choices. Since deregulation, however, broadcasters have been 
most pedestrian and guided largely by program ratings, causing 
the program fare to suffer from sa~neness.~' From the broadcast- 
ers' financial perspective, a programming strategy based primar- 
ily on ratings seems to work, and it follows that attention to 
audience interest seems to be an objective of the broadcasting 
business. This statement, of course, assumes that audience inter- 
est and the public interest are synonymous concepts. In fact, 
audiences may have interests as diverse as the population, 
although the ratings may not reflect this diversity because of 
practical and empirical flaws in the surveying techniques.32 
31. For the Fall 1990 television season, comedy dominated prime-time. The three 
networks and Fox Broadcasting offered 20 new comedy shows, adding to schedules 
already crowded with situation comedies. Of the 93 entertainment programs (not 
counting news, sports or movies) in prime-time, 50 were comedies. NBC aired a rec- 
ord 16 half-hour comedy shows. ABC aired 14, and Fox and CBS each aired 10. 
Carter, For Networks, the Punch Line is a Bigger Bottom Line, N.Y. Times, July 16, 
1990, at D6, col 1. It seems then that the situation-comedy reigns, since this type of 
program received the highest ratings last season. NBC Squeaks by CBS to Another 
Sweeps Win, BROADCASTING, May 28, 1990, at 32. 
The decline in program variety began in the mid-1960s when the networks 
switched from 30-minute programs that had dominated the prime-time schedule dur- 
ing the 1950s to the 60-minute format, with the exception of the situation-comedy. 
Starting in 1971, the three networks began to concentrate on just three formats: situa- 
tion comedies, crime dramas and movies. Since that year, these three program types 
have filled an average of 59% of all prime-time. S. EASTMAN, S. HEAD & L. KLEIN, 
BROADCAST/~ABLE PROGRAMMING STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES 143 (2d ed.1985) 
[hereinafter EASTMAN]. See also Atkins & Litman, Network TV Programming: Eco- 
nomics, Audiences, and the Ratings Game, 1971-1986, 36 J. COMM. 32-35 (1986) 
(pointing out that networks act in a uniform and interdependent manner in the area of 
programming; that coordinated profit-maximizing conduct has produced an increase 
in homogeneity and a decrease in diversity among program formats; and that while 
schedule manipulation and political factors are variables which may affect the ratings 
game and produce a different relationship, profit and loss considerations play a central 
role and are the primary explanatory factors in program renewals); McDonald & 
Achecter, Audience Role in the Evolution of Fictional Television Content, 32 J. BROAD- 
CASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 66-71 (1988) (the authors conducted an empirical 
study which examined audience ratings as a component of the feedback processes in 
the evolution of program types and found strong relationships between audience rat- 
ings and the number of programs of a given type subsequently aired). 
32. Recent reports show network concerns over flaws in the Nielsen ratings sys- 
tem. Among other things, the rate of cooperation by potential participants may dis- 
tort the random nature that the system needs in order to represent accurately an entire 
nation's viewing. Viewers who agree to use the "people meter" may have systemati- 
cally different television habits from those who refuse. Kneale, TV's Nielsen Ratings, 
Long Unquestioned, Face Tough Challenges, Wall St. J., July 19, 1990, at Al,  col. 6; 
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Beyond the problems with accuracy and scientific signifi- 
cance, a larger problem exists with a decisionmaking process 
based simply on the highest ratings. This system is not calcu- 
lated toward a fair assessment of larger audience concerns. Ad- 
mittedly, licensees must also contend with their program 
advertisers who rationally choose to advertise during popular 
shows with high viewership. Herman and Chomsky argue that 
the power of advel-tisers over television programming stems 
from the simple fact that they are the "patrons" who provide the 
media subsidy: "the media compete for their patronage, devel- 
oping specialized staff to solicit advertisers and necessarily hav- 
ing to explain how their programs serve advertisers' needs."33 
These advertisers then become "normative reference orga- 
nizations," whose requirements and demands the media must 
see also Nielsen Peoplemeters Get Two-Year Network Review, BROADCASTING, Dec. 
18,1989, at 68 (ABC, NBC and CBS sponsored a study which found major tabulation 
errors for larger households and those with cable); NAB, Networks Call for Study of 
Peoplemeters, BROADCASTING, Mar. 21, 1988, at 27 (networks charged there were 
biases in sample groups and that some family members, particularly young children, 
were not properly registering their viewing). 
Even broadcasters, whose advertising dollars have ebbed because of reportedly 
low viewership, have challenged the accuracy of audience surveys. New studies con- 
tend that the Nielsen ratings significantly understate viewing in a number of ways, 
especially by children and young adults and by people in bars, hotels and on vacation. 
In general, the accuracy of the ratings depends upon the faithfulness of the viewers in 
logging their program choices. Studies show that viewers often: (1) forget or neglect 
to activate the ~onitoring device (the people meter); (2) log in, but do not watch the 
program; or (3) are too young to report viewing accurately (e.g., tots watching Satur- 
day morning cartoons). Then there is the problem of obtaining a sample of house- 
holds sufficient to produce statistically significant results. In fact, almost half of 
homes contacted by Nielsen r e h e  to join its people meter sample, and only 47% stay 
on as members of the Nielsen system. A recent phone survey of 26,000 homes indi- 
cated that 26% more men aged 18 to 34 and 33% more kids watched TV than Nielsen 
showed for the same period. The phone survey also showed 52% more visitors 
watched television in other people's homes than Nielsen reported. Kneale, TV's NieE 
sen Ratings, Long Unquestioned, Fact Tough Challenges, Wall St. J., July 19, 1990, at 
Al, col. 6; see also Nielsen Study Finds 6 3  Million Uncounted Viewers, BROADCAST- 
ING, May 14, 1990, at 40. 
33. E. HERMAN & N. CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 16 (1988) [hereinafter HERMAN & CHOMSKY]. The 
authors sketch a "propaganda model" and apply it to the performance of the mass 
media in the United States. They provide a critical analysis of the media's coverage of 
several prominent national and world events, such as the strife in El Salvador, Guate- 
mala and Nicaragua, Third World elections, the KGB-Bulgarian plot to kill the Pope, 
Indochina Wars, and the murders of Jerzy Popieluszko and Archbishop Oscar 
Romero. 
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accommodate in order to succeed.34 They impose their will 
through the withdrawal and cancellation of advertisements on 
politically sensitive or unfavorable programs.35 Herman and 
Chomsky state: 
Television networks learn over time that such programs will not sell 
34. Id. "For a television network, an audience gain or loss of one percentage 
point in the Nielsen ratings translates into a change in advertising revenue of from $80 
to $100 million a year, with some variation depending on measures of audience 'qual- 
ity.' " Id. 
35. In May 1990, Proctor & Gamble Co., parent company of Folgers Coffee Co. 
and one of the biggest advertisers in television, canceled $70,000 worth of ads for all 
its products from CBS affiliate WHDH-TV in Boston because the station aired a com- 
mercial protesting Folgers' use of coffee beans grown in El Salvador. Proctor & Gam- 
ble spent about $1 million annually in advertising at WHDH-TV. Proctor & Gamble 
Pulls TV Ads Over Slur to Coffee, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1990, at 1. The offending 
commercial was produced by Neighbor-to-Neighbor, a grassroots organization work- 
ing to change policy in Central America. The commercial was offered to stations in 
Cincinnati, New Orleans, Kansas City and Boston. WHDH-TV was the only station 
to air the commercial. 
One "reality based" program presenting too much controversy for advertisers' 
comfort was the NBC airing of "Roe v. Wade," a made-for-TV movie based on the 
1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision. Several advertisers withdrew commercial time 
fearing potential boycotts by groups who disapproved of the program's content. The 
network nonetheless aired the program, stating that the show did not advocate a par- 
ticular viewpoint, but instead represented both positions. Wright Defends 'Roe' to 
Advertisers, BROADCASTING, May 15, 1989, at 31. 
ABC reported that it lost more than $14 million because advertisers pulled com- 
mercial spots from prime-time programs those advertisers perceived as too controver- 
sial. The network lost $1 million after promoters backed away from an episode of 
"thirtysomething" which showed two gay men talking in bed. Advertisers also pulled 
ads from an episode of "Roseanne" which dealt with teenage drinking. Igor Chastises 
Sponsors for Leaping Before Looking, BROADCASTING, July 30, 1990, at 53. 
In 1985, public television station WNET lost its comorate funding from Gulf & 
Western ~ndustries, Inc. after the station showed a docum&ary, " ~ u n & y  for Profit," 
which contained material critical of multinational comorate activities in the Third 
World. The chief executive of Gulf & Western comsained that the program was 
"virulently anti-business if not anti-American." HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 
33, at 17. Herman and Chomsky state: 
Large corporate advertisers on television will rarely sponsor programs that 
engage in serious criticisms of corporate activities, such as the problem of 
environmental degradation, the workings of the military-industrial complex, 
or corporate support of and benefits from Third World tyrannies . . . . 
. . . .  
Advertisers will want . . . to avoid programs with serious complexities 
and disturbing controversies that interfere with the "buying mood." They 
seek programs that will lightly entertain and thus fit in with the spirit of the 
primary purpose of program purchases-the dissemination of a selling 
message. . . . [They] will usually not want to sponsor close examinations of 
sensitive and divisive issues . . . . 
Id. 
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and would have to be carried at a financial sacrifice, and that, in 
addition, they may offend powefil advertisers. . . .With the rise in 
the price of advertising spots, the forgone revenue increases; and 
with increasing market pressure for financial performance and the 
diminishing constraints from regulation, an advertising-based media 
system will gradually increase advertising time and marginalize or 
eliminate altogether programming that has significant public-affairs 
content.36 
Despite these concerns with power and control by advertis- 
ers, corporate broadcasters must have some basis on which to 
make assessments about programs. Nevertheless, this concern 
does not validate the exclusive use of audience ratings. Broad- 
casters may just as well survey educators, community leaders 
and public interest organizations to learn of audience interests. 
Under the existing practice, however, ratings which determine 
advertising volume and prices, determine the commercial suc- 
cess of the broadcaster, which in turn, determines program 
choices. While it is difEcult to counter the argument that pros- 
perous corporations, including those that are broadcast licen- 
sees, do not serve any public ends, it is another matter to say 
that this should be the only philosophy to judge the choices and 
operations of corporate broadcasters. The Act must have been 
intended for something loftier than pumping ratings.37 This idea 
36. HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 33, at 17; see also B. OWEN, J. BEEBE, W. 
MANNING & W. WILLARD, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 101 (1974); Atkins & Litman, 
supra note 31, at 32-33 (presenting a model to ascertain the "critical mass" in ratings 
points required to facilitate renewal of prime-time network programs and maintaining 
that a network will cancel a series if the associated production and other hourly pro- 
gram costs continue to exceed the net advertising revenues and, especially, if the show 
demonstrates little prospect for improvement); Dominick & Pearce, Trends in Net- 
work Prime-Time Programming 1953-74, 26 J .  COMM. 70 (Winter 1976). See gener- 
ally E m ,  supra note 31, at 129-30. 
37. In recent years, some commentators argue that the Act intended the FCC to 
do nothing more than coordinate broadcast operations so as to avoid electrical inter- 
ference. They argue that no grounds exist for denying the electronic media the same 
First Amendment protection afforded to the print media and reject the theory that the 
scarcity of this public resource warrants governmental scrutiny of broadcast opera- 
tions. See, kg., Mayron, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC, 
38 EMORY L.J. 715 (1989). Legislative history is contrary to these new claims. See F. 
KAHN, supra note 10, at 412-16. Long-unchallenged court rulings on this point also 
are contrary. See, kg., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 367,388 (1969) 
(although broadcasting is a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, "[wlhere 
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequen- 
cies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast 
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish"); NBC v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943) (the Court rejected the argument that the 
Heinonline - -  43 Fed. Comm. L.J. 403 1990-1991 
404 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL pol. 43 
may seem to suggest that to the extent that the two-audience 
interest (assuming that it can be discerned) and the public inter- 
est-conilict, audience interest as measured by these ratings 
should be ignored on the theory that the surveyed listener or 
viewer cannot value accurately and will reject a documentary or 
news program in favor of rock music or the situation comedy. 
The idea that there should be some disinterested agent in- 
fluencing program choices is not as un-American as it &st ap- 
pears, for it rests on the idea that broadcasting cannot be viewed 
merely as a commercial system that operates on its own (or in 
response to market forces). Indeed, it is the media that "serve[s] 
to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the 
state and private activity," through its "choices, emphases, and 
omissions."38 The media is "able to ik the premises of dis- 
course, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, 
hear, and think And of equal concern is the media's 
encouragement and reinforcement of stereotypical and false 
 image^.^ To be sure, this is not an argument in favor of a "Mn- 
FCC was a mere "traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from 
interfering with each other" and found that "[tlhe facilities of radio are S i t e d  and 
therefore precious; they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public 
interest . . ."). For a more recent ruling, see Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. 
Ct. 2997 (1990). 
38. HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 33, at xi. 
39. Id. A recent study reported: 
A growing body of research evidence suggests that television plays an impor- 
tant role in socialization, especially for the young viewer. Footnote omit- 
ted]. Social learning theory provides the dominant theoretical framework in 
accounting for television's socialization effects. Footnote omitted]. Central 
to social learning is a focus on . . . behavioral actions of others. Footnote 
omitted]. 
.... 
. . . Television portrayals of behaviors and their causes may reflect, reinforce 
and/or influence people's implicit theories of social causality, thus warrant- 
ing research attention. 
Baxter & Kaplan, Context Factors in the Analysis of Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior 
on Prime Time Television, 27 J .  BROADCASTING 25, 27 (1983). See generally, G. 
C o ~ s r o c ~ ,  S. CHAFFEE, N. KATZMAN, M. MCCOMBS & D. ROBERTS, TELEVISION 
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1978). 
4-0. A. BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977); D. CATER & S. STRICK- 
LAND, T.V. VIOLENCE AND THE CHILD - THE EVOLUTION AND FATE OF THE SUR- 
GEON GENERAL'S REPORT (1975); Downs & Gowan, Sex Direrenc in 
Reinforcement and Punishment on Prime-Time Television, 6 SEX ROLES 683 (1980) 
("One of the most influential factors in the development of children's sex-role stereo- 
types and behaviors is television"); Greenberg, CHILDREN'S REACTIONS TO TELEVI- 
SION BLACKS, 49 JOURNALISM Q. 5 (1972) (black and white youngsters identify with 
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istry of Inf~rmation,"~~ but one to urge the employment of the 
power of the medium to the advantage and progress of our polit- 
ical society. 
111. CHOOSING CONTENT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The view that media corporations are privileged and should 
be encouraged to choose programs of some merit, beyond the 
simple entertainment value as would generate high ratings, is 
not just that of a lone disappointed television viewer. Even 
shareholders (whose economic interests in shows with high rat- 
ings, although of low merit, is obvious) have demanded higher 
standards. Most often, these demands take the form of share- 
holder proposals to be delivered at the corporations' annual 
meetings.42 Not only have the efforts of these shareholders gone 
black television characters; white youngsters who watch blacks most on television are 
more likely to believe that real-life blacks are accurately portrayed). 
41. See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
42. See CBS, SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS 326 (1989); Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS 323 (1989); General Elec. Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, LEXIS 304 (1989); Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS 1619 
(1988). 
Networks have long-maintained broadcast standards and practices departments 
that exercise total authority over all network programming. See EASTMAN, supra 
note 31, at 142. These departments "often find [themselves] walking a thin line be- 
tween offending viewers or advertisers and destroying imaginative programming that ' 
may pull in high ratings." Id. On the whole however, the editorial power of these 
censors has been limited. For example, one department recently confronted the ques- 
tion of whether to censor bikini briefs in favor of boxer shorts. Id. In recent years, all 
three networks have significantly reduced the staffs of these departments, but not 
without protest from viewers and shareholders. 
One CBS shareholder stated: 
The need for. . . self-policing by the networks is obvious. Viewers are 
concerned about the portrayal of sex, and violence, drug use and other anti- 
social conduct on T.V. They resent misleading and tasteless commercials. 
.... 
Broadcasters are required to serve the public interest. The public interest is 
not served by lowering standards and eviscerating the staff needed to enforce 
them. CBS is responding to competition by cheapening its product, not by 
improving quality. That is a questionable response from the point of view of 
its own interests, but it also clashes with the public interest. 
CBS, SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS 326, 6-7 (1989). 
A group of General Electric shareholders argued that: 
The current trend in NBC broadcasting pattern shows a nearly total disre- 
gard for any understanding that the networks owe the public (or the Con- 
gress) a special duty of responsibility. Not only network programming, but 
also advertising contains excessive violence, indecent language, nudity, toler- 
ant portrayals of drug use, semi-explicit sex, deviant perversions and other 
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largely uncelebrated by the media, they have been thwarted by a 
most formidable board position-that the nature, presentation 
and content of television programming is within the discretion of 
the corporation's managers. The board can assert this as a mat- 
ter of general corporation law and also under federal securities 
laws.43 To this extent, the board need not even communicate 
these shareholders' concerns to other shareholders, much less 
illegal conduct. The Company stands in violation of its own company 
standards! 
. . . .  
In quite a direct way our resolution puts before the Company management 
and the other shareholders the extraordinary question of how, exactly, the 
GE/NBC management is contending with the wide-spread degeneration in 
the area of decency. Cutting of standards staffs by GE/NBC and the disre- 
garding of its own-long-stan&ng regulations app& to open the flood gates 
of national TV degradation, thereby desensitizing the public on a number of 
vital issues and piomoting-a kind-of anti-social-behavior that is certain to 
meet with resistance from individual Americans and American groups from 
every walk of life; not just from the so-called "right", but across the political 
spectrum. 
Flagrant disregard for the public welfare is certain to awaken the Con- 
gress to wonder why, if broadcasters no longer are required to meet a certain 
high standard to justify their use of a public monopoly on the electro-mag- 
netic spectrum, they should be accorded its exclusive use through licensing. 
General Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS 304, 5-6 (1989). 
A group of Walt Disney shareholders proposed that: 
WHEREAS, U.S. television, film, and cable programs impact a worldwide 
audience with images reaching millions of women, men and youth, irrespec- 
tive of racial, ethnic, economic group or sex, and this filmed programming is 
recognized as an important socialization influencing how persons view them- 
selves and their world. 
WHEREAS, Minorities and women, and especially youth, are major viewers 
of film, television and cable programming and consumers of advertised prod- 
- - 
ucts associated with these programs, b k  they are not significantly repre- 
sented in the creative, managerial and professional decision-making 
- - 
positions in these industries; 
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that we shareholders request the Board 
of Directors of Walt Disney Company, Inc. to provide AfErmative Action 
reports . . . [to] include . . . [a] list of names and titles of all minorities and 
women working on film, television and cable programming who perform as: 
executive producers; producers; . . . writers; directors; . . . [a] description of 
approaches to better utilize the skills of minorities and women in the afore- 
mentioned programming development and production positions. 
Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS 1619, 3 (1988). 
43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, General Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. 
240.14a-8(c)(l), (7) (1990). Rule l4a-8 provides that where an eligible stockholder 
(i.e., one who is a record or beneficial owner of at least 1% or $1000 in market value 
of securities for at least one year) notifies the corporation of his intention to present a 
proposal for action at a forthcoming meeting of stockholders, the corporation must set 
forth the proposal in its proxy statement which it mails to the stockholders. 
This provision is subject to thirteen exceptions, Rules 14a-8(c)(l) through (c)(13), 
Heinonline - -  43 Fed. Comm. L.J. 406 1990-1991 
Number 31 TIME CULTURE 407 
consider anything besides the profitability of programs.44 
The state of the law then is this: while the Act mandates 
service in the "public interest, convenience and necessity," the 
Commission requires nothing of broadcasters and only reacts ii 
a negative fashion (through sanctions such as denial of renewal 
and fines) in the face of proven wrongdoing by licensees;45 and 
while corporation law requires directors to manage the corpora- 
tion so as to achieve maximum shareholder wealth, it also per- 
mits directors to indulge other non-shareholder interests.46 This 
means that in this era of deregulation, corporate broadcasters 
can (but are not required to) assess program worth based on cri- 
teria other than audience ratings. But if they did, that is, if the 
directors of WCBS-TV declined to contract for "Uncle 
because, like "Married . . . With Children," it is base and 
any one of which permits the corporation to omit the proposal. The two exceptions 
cited above provide: 
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a 
proper subject for action by security holders. 
Note: Whether a proposal is a proper subject for action by security 
holders will depend on the applicable state law. Under certain states' laws, a 
proposal that mandates certain action by the registrant's boards of directors 
may not be a proper subject matter for shareholder action, while a proposal 
recommending or requesting such action of the board may be proper under 
such state laws. 
.... 
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordi- 
nary business operations . . . . 
17 C.F.R. 5 240.14a-8(c)(l), (7) (1990). 
44. SEC No-Action Letters, supra note 42 (where the SEC decided to take no 
action on the boards' decisions to omit such shareholder proposals from the corpora- 
tions' proxy materials. 
45. Licensees are subject to penalties, for example, when they violate law or are 
dishonest with the FCC. See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast 
Licensing, 5 FCC Rcd 3252, 67 R.R.2d 1107 (1990); Policy Regarding Character 
Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179, 59 R.R.2d 801, reconsider- 
ation granted in part. denied in part, 1 FCC Rcd 421, 61 R.R.2d 619 (1986), appeal 
dismissed sub nom National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, No. 86-1179 
@.C. Cir. June 11,1987), modified, 5 FCC Rcd 3252,67 R.R.2d 1107 (1990). Licen- 
sees also are subject to penalties when they violate specific regulations. 47 U.S.C. 
4 307(d) (1988) (short renewal); 47 U.S.C. $503(b) (1988) (fines for willful 
violations). 
46. See supra note 26. 
47. "Uncle Buck" is based on the movie of the same name. The main character is 
Buck Russell (John Candy in the film version), the "ne'er-do-well, coarse black sheep 
of the family," a "slob who eats constantly, smokes cigars," and "drives around in an 
incredibly noisy old boat of a car." VARIETY, Aug. 16, 1989, at 20 (Film Review). 
"Buck takes charge of his nephew and two nieces when their parents are suddenly 
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demeaning to women, the decision would be upheld as a valid 
exercise of the director's business judgment as a matter of corpo- 
rate law. This issue of such managerial discretion is the subject 
of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN 
BOARD DECISION MAKING 
The main business of Time, Inc. is the publication of 
magazines and books. But Time has other substantial communi- 
cations activities in pay television services through its subsidiar- 
ies, Home Box Office, Inc. and Cinemax, which deliver 
programs through cable systems nationwide, American Televi- 
sion and Communication Corporation, which owns several cable 
television franchises, and broadcast licensee, Turner Broadcast- 
ing System.48 Time's executives began considering expansion 
beyond mere delivery of television programming into develop- 
ment and production in 1983. In 1987, a special committee of 
executives resolved to pursue such a plan on the basis of two 
considerations: Time's desire to have greater control over qual- 
ity and price of the film products delivered through its cable net- 
work and franchises; and Time's concern over the increasing 
globalization of the world economy. Some of Time's outside di- 
rectors, however, opposed this move as a threat to the editorial 
integrity and journalistic focus of Time, i.e., the "Time Culture." 
They believed that Time had become recognized in this country 
as an "institution built upon a foundation of journalistic integ- 
rity." In the board's view: "Time is an 'American institution' 
and has represented 'an enormous degree of integrity and hon- 
esty in trying to bring the news to the world.'. . . [It] has built a 
unique bond of trust with the American people."49 
called out of town. The six and eight year old are precocious, wise-cracking kids with 
a colorful vocabulary." Travers, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 7, 1987, at 32 (Film Review). 
48. The operation of cable systems is subject to regulation by the Federal Com- 
munications Policy Act of 1985, 47 U.S.C. 5 521 (1990). Section 521 sets forth the 
purposes of the Federal Communications Policy Act, in particular to "establish 
franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and development of 
cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and 
interests of the local community." 
49. Time Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 15-16, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 
@el. 1989) (C.A. No. 10,866). This philosophy also controlled the operation of 
Time's cable business. Id. 
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It seemed that Time could achieve these goals best through 
a merger with a company already in the business of program 
production. Warner Brothers was its first choice.50 When the 
first meeting with Warner Brothers5* did not culminate in any 
agreement, Time considered other entertainment companies, in- 
cluding Disney, 20th Century Fox, Universal, and Paramount, 
although it continued talks with Warner Brothers. The Time 
board thought that a merger of Time and Warner was feasible 
only if: (1) a favorable stock-for-stock exchange could be negoti- 
ated; and (2) Time controlled the board of the resulting corpora- 
tion in order to preserve a management committed to Time's 
journalistic integrity, i.e., the "Time C u l t ~ r e . " ~ ~  
After several months of further negotiations, the parties 
reached an agreement and approved the stock-for-stock merger 
in March 1989. The resulting company would have a 24-mem- 
ber board, with 12 members representing each corporation. The 
board would create an editorial committee with a majority of 
members representing Time. A similar entertainment commit- 
tee would be controlled by Warner board members. 
While Paramount seemed to have held ideas for the acquisi- 
tion of Time, its disclosure surprised the business world.53 As 
50. Warner Brothers was in the business of the creation, production and distribu- 
tion of films and programs for television and theaters. Defendant Warner Communi- 
cations, Inc.'s Brief in Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motions for a Preliminary Injunction 
at 16-18, Paramount Communications, Inc,  571 A.2d 1140 (C.A. No. 10,866). 
51. Time and Warner Brothers discussed the possibility of a joint venture between 
the two companies through the creation of a jointly-owned cable company. Time 
would contribute its cable system and HBO. Warner would contribute its cable sys- 
tem and provide access to its Warner Brothers Studio. The resulting venture would be 
a large, more efficient cable network which would produce and distribute its own mov- 
ies on a worldwide basis. Ultimately, the parties abandoned this plan, determining 
that it was impractical for several reasons, chiefly because of tax considerations. Para- 
mount Communications, Inc,  571 A.2d at  1144-45. 
52. Warner also insisted on a stock-for-stock exchange and sought to preserve "its 
shareholders' equity in the resulting corporation." Id. at 1145. While the parties 
agreed that a stock-for-stock exchange was the best course, talks broke down over 
corporate governance issues. Time wanted a co-CEO proposal by Warner to be tem- 
porary and for the Warner CEO to retire in five years. However, the Warner CEO: 
"[Rlefused to set a time for his retirement and viewed Time's proposal as indicating a 
lack of confidence in his leadership. Warner considered it vital that their executives 
and creative staff not perceive Warner as selling out to Time." Id. Warner rejected 
Time's request for a guarantee that Time would dominate the CEO succession "as 
inconsistent with the concept of a Time-Warner merger 'of equals."' Id. This im- 
passe brought an end to negotiations. 
53. Apparently, the suddenness of Paramount's offer was feigned, because its 
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the T h e  board was likely to resist these ideas, Paramount began 
its takeover attempt by a tender offer to purchase all outstanding 
shares of Time for $175 per share. The next day, the trading 
price of Time's stock leaped from $126 to $170 per share. Para- 
mount later proposed a merger to the Time board. Not sunpris- 
ingly, the Time board considered Paramount's offer inadequate 
and concluded that the proposed merger with Warner was best 
for the corporation. While Time refused to negotiate with Para- 
mount, the Time board realized that Paramount could still pre- 
vail through the purchase of the Time stock from individual 
shareholders. The Time board took the position that because it 
was charged by statute with directing the corporation and ensur- 
ing its well-being, and these shareholders (many of whom were 
institutional investors) could not appreciate the long-term bene- 
fits of the Warner merger, but would succumb to the temptation 
of certain cash, Time must defend against the takeover-to pro- 
tect Time's control over its own destiny, as well as the equally 
precious "Time Cult~re."'~ 
Paramount raised the all-cash offer to $200 per share, but 
~ ~p - -- - ~p 
board had decided as early as March 1989 to move to acquire Time. Paramount, 
however, delayed announcement of its proposal "until Time had mailed to its stock- 
holders its Time-Warner merger proposal along with the required proxy statements" 
in order to create maximum confusion to shareholders. Id. at 1147 n.8. 
54. The Time board decided to recast its consolidation with Warner into an out- 
right cash and securities acquisition of Warner by Time. This course would not re- 
quire the approval of Time stockholders, but only board action. The restructured deal 
proposed that: "Time would make an immediate all-cash offer for 51% of Warner's 
outstanding stock at $70 per share"; Time would purchase the remaining 49% "at 
some later date for a mixture of cash and securities worth $70 per share"; "[tlo pro- 
vide the funds required for its outright acquisition of Warner, Time would assume 7- 
10 billion dollars worth of debt, thus eliminating one of the principal transaction- 
related benefits of the original merger agreement"; and, finally, Time also agreed to 
pay and amortize a $9 billion payment to Warner for the goodwill of Warner. Id. at 
1148. 
Warner's response to this proposal is described as follows: 
Warner agreed, but insisted on certain terms. Warner sought a control pre- 
mium and guarantees that the governance provisions [(i.e., that there would 
be co-CEO's, one from Time, one from Warner, for a period of years after 
the merger)] found in the original merger agreement would remain intact. 
Warner further sought agreements that . . . unless enjoined, Time would be 
legally bound to complete the transaction. Time's board agreed to these last 
measures only at the insistence of Warner. For its part, Time was assured of 
its ability to extend its efforts into production areas and international mar- 
kets, all the while maintaining the Time identity and culture. 
Id. at 1148-49. 
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the Time board rejected this offer on the same grounds. Para- 
mount then filed an action seeking a preliminary injunction to 
halt Time's defensive maneuvers. While Paramount's narrow 
interests were undeniable, as a shareholder of Time, it had the 
right to insist that board decisionmaking accord with strict fidu- 
ciary standards designed to protect the corporation. Paramount 
argued that the Time board failed to adhere to these standards in 
responding to Paramount's offer. Thus, Time's decision to reject 
Paramount and enter into the revised merger agreement with 
Warner was not entitled to the benefit of the business judgment 
rule. Speciiically, Paramount argued that the Time directors 
had abdicated their responsibilities to the Time shareholders in 
favor of the "Time Cultureyy-a term, created by management 
and adopted by the directors, that involved little more than the 
preservation and enhancement of Time senior management 
p~si t ions .~~ 
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected Paramount's chal- 
lenge and held that the decision did warrant the court's defer- 
ence under the business judgment rule.56 This rule is a 
presumption that in making decisions, the directors have acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that 
the action taken is in the corporation's best intere~t.~' Under it, 
directors will not be liable for and the courts will not interfere 
with, nor pass upon, the wisdom of the board's decisions.58 And 
55. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Paramount Communications, Inc. and 
KDS Acquisition Corp. at 14-17, Paramount Communications, Inc,  571 A.2d 1140 
(No. 279); Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion For A Preliminary In- 
junction at 11 & 21, 571 A.2d 1140 (No. 279). 
56. However, the court first addressed the issue of whether the company was "for 
sale," an event which would trigger special duties for the board. The court found that 
the restructured deal with Wamer did not have the effect of putting the corporation 
up for sale, which would have required the board to choose the course that would 
maximize immediate shareholder value. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold- 
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 @el. 1986). Instead, the court viewed the board's reac- 
tion to Paramount's hostile tender offer as only a defensive response to a perceived 
threat to the well-being of the corporation; it was not an abandonment of the corpora- 
tion's strategic plans. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1150-51 @el. 1989). 
57. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,872 @el. 1985). The party challenging 
a board decision has the burden of rebutting the presumption that the board acted 
within its discretion under the business judgment rule by showing gross negligence, 
bad faith, breach of trust or other such wrongful conduct. Id. 
58. Id. 
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so long as the decision can be attributed to any rational purpose, 
the court may only consider the process by which the board for- 
mulated its decision. Clearly, this rule makes sense in ordinary 
matters, such as a decision to contract, to open or close a divi- 
sion, or to pay dividends. The extraordinary case of the hostile 
takeover, however, offers reasons not to indulge the board of di- 
rectors to the same extent. Indeed, the Delaware courts have 
wisely recognized that "where issues of corporate control are at 
stake, there exists the omnipresent specter that a board may be 
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation and its  shareholder^."^^ In such cases, there is rea- 
son to inquire whether a defensive posture is no more than an 
instance of board entrenchment. 
This issue was formally addressed in Unoctal Corp. v. hfesta 
Petroleum CO.~O There, the Delaware Supreme Court estab- 
lished an intermediate form of judicial review to judge the con- 
duct of an independent board of directors in addressing a 
pending takeover bid. In these circumstances, the board must 
meet an "enhanced duty" at the threshold before it receives the 
normal protections of the business judgment rule.61 This is to 
say that while in ordinary matters, the business judgment rule is 
a presumption of good faith in favor of the board, in a hostile 
takeover attempt, the board must make an initial showing of 
good faith to earn the court's deference. The court adopted a 
two-pronged test: 
before the business judgment rule is applied to a board's adoption of 
a defensive measure, the burden will lie with the board to prove (a) 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy 
and effectiveness existed; and (b) that the defensive measure 
adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. [citation 
omitted] Directors satisfy the first part of th[is] . . . test by demon- 
strating good faith and reasonable investigation. [citations 
omitted].62 
59. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 @el. 1989). 
60. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
61. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 @el. 
1989). 
62. Id. The court explained further: "Unocal involved a two-tier, highly coercive 
tender offer. In such case, the threat is obvious: shareholders may be compelled to 
tender to avoid being treated adversely in the second stage of the transaction." Id. 
(Citation omitted). 
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What is the nature of the "danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness" that would give rise to the privilege (and perhaps 
duty) of the board to defend against an aggressor (and thus war- 
rant judicial deference)? Paramount argued that the only legally 
cognizable danger is inadequate value as viewed objectively of 
the takeover company's bid. And since Paramount made an all- 
cash offer at well-above the then market price, there was no dan- 
ger to corporate policy and effectiveness. Paramount asserted 
further that such "non-shareholder specific concerns,"63 namely 
the "Time Cultureyy and this notion of journalistic integrity, did 
not amount to a corporate policy entitled to any recognition by 
the court. Besides, Paramount pointed out, even assuming the 
point for the moment, it too had integrity.64 
To be sure, in the face of Paramount's challenge of the pro- 
priety of such a nontraditional view of the corporation's objec- 
tive, the Time board labored to charaqterize the "Time Culture" 
as a legitimate corporate policy. Logically, the Time board as- 
serted that there was a " 'direct relationship' between Time's in- 
tegrity and value for its ~hareholders,"~~ and that it was " 'not 
simply culture for culture's sake' - Time's magazines earn more 
than a third of the profits earned by all U.S. magazines, and have 
22% of the revenues (as opposed to 8% for the number two 
~ompany)."~~ At the same time, the board candidly argued that 
the " 'Time Culture' importantly include[d] directors' concerns 
for the larger role of the enterprise in society."67 As stated by 
the corporation's founder and reaffirmed by his son and director, 
63. Id. at 1149; see also Plaintiff's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for a Pre- 
liminary Injunction at 53, Paramount Communications, Inc, 571 A.2d 1140 (C.A. 
No. 10,866). 
64. The court stated: 
Paramount and the individual plaintiffs extrapolate a rule of law that an all- 
cash, all-shares offer with values reasonably in the range of acceptable price 
cannot pose any objective threat to a corporation or its shareholders. Thus, 
Paramount would have us hold that only if the value of Paramount's offer 
were determined to be clearly inferior to the value created by management's 
plan to merge with Warner could the offer be viewed-objectively-as a 
threat. 
571 A.2d at 1152-53. 
65. Time Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintas' Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 16, 571 A.2d 1140 (C.A. No. 10,866). 
66. Answering Brief of Time Appellees at 8, 571 A.2d 1140 (No. 279). 
67. Id. at 9. 
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Time is "an enterprise operated in the public interest."'j8 Under 
this view, inadequate value was only one cognizable danger 
posed by Paramount.'j9 
The Court agreed with Time that Paramount's construction 
of earlier chancery decisions was too narrow and rigid.70 The 
court explained: 
Unocal is not intended as an abstract standard; neither is it a 
structured and mechanistic procedure of appraisal. Thus, we have 
said that directors may consider, when evaluating the threat posed 
by a takeover bid, the "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and 
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituen- 
cies' other than shareholders . . . the risk of nonconsummation, and 
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange. 99 71 
Accordingly, the court concluded: 
m h e  Time board reasonably determined that inadequate value was 
not the only legally cognizable threat that Paramount's all-cash, all- 
shares offer could present. Time's board concluded that Para- 
mount's eleventh hour offer posed other threats. One concern was 
- -  - 
68. Time Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 34, 571 A.2d 1140 (C.A. 10,866). 
69. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 @el. 
1989). The court went on to find that the board made an informed decision, having 
fully investigated the matter. Id. at 1153-54. On the second part of the Unocal analy- 
sis, the court explained the board's burden as follows: 
The obvious requisite to determining the reasonableness of a defensive action 
is a clear identification of the nature of the threat. As the Chancellor cor- 
rectly noted, this "requires an evaluation of the importance of the corporate 
objective threatened; alternative methods of protecting that objective; im- 
pacts of the 'defensive' action, and other relevant factors." 
Id. at 1154 (citation omitted). 
On the facts there, the court found that the defensive action taken was a reason- 
able response to the perceived threat-it was "not aimed at 'cramming down' on its 
shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the carry- 
ing forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form." Id. at 1154-55. Further, 
the revised agreement "did not preclude Paramount from making an offer for the 
combined Time-Warner company or from changing the conditions of its offer so as 
not to make the offer dependent upon the nullification of the Time-Warner agree- 
ment." Id. at 1155. 
70. Id. at 1153. 
71. Id. (Citation omitted). The court stated further that: 
p]he question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrele- 
vant because directors, generally, are obliged to charter [sic] a course for a 
corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment 
horizon. Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Rev- 
lon, a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed man- 
ner, is not under per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short 
term, even in the context of a takeover. 
Id. at 1150. 
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that Time shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash 
offer in ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which 
a business combination with Warner might pr~duce?~ 
Indeed, "the record attests to the zealousness of Time's execu- 
tives, fully supported by their directors, in seeing to the preser- 
vation of Time's 'culture,' i.e., its perceived editorial integrity in 
joumali~m."~~ 
Significantly, the Time board rejected a philosophy that was 
calculated to produce immediate shareholder wealth in favor of 
other intangible, non-shareholder specific ends, whose relation- 
ship with long-term economic benefit was at most tenuous. To 
champion the notion of the "Time Culture" at the economic ex- 
pense of shareholders is almost revolutionary. However, it is not 
clear from the case (nor from the "other constituency" stat- 
u t e ~ ~ ~ )  to what extent and degree the board must show some 
72. Id. at 1153. 
73. Id. at 1152. 
74. Some commentators have criticized these statutes as unwise and unworkable. 
See, cg., Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for 
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990); Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constituency Stat- 
utes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have Come, 3 INSIGHTS No. 3, at 20 @ec. 
1989). 
The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws states: 
Other constituency statutes have typically been adopted as one measure, 
among others, designed to assist directors in forestalling unwanted take- 
overs. However, they address a question that is of much broader significance 
in corporate law and to society in general: whose interests should a corpora- 
tion serve? The issues posed by this question are: 
(1) whether the corporation has some responsibility to employees, commu- 
nities, and the others enumerated in other constituency statutes; (2) if so, 
how these thus far legally unenforceable responsibilities (except when they 
are created by contract, e.g., employment agreements, or specific statute, 
e.g., laws imposing environmental obligations) are to be meshed with the 
legally enforceable obligations of directors to shareholders; and (3) whether 
the board of directors should have the power or the duty to prefer the inter- 
ests of those constituencies over the interests of shareholders in some 
circumstances. 
. . . . 
. . . The Committee believes that if the existing law is to be changed, how- 
ever, it should be done only after a thoughtful, national debate dealing with 
the many and profound consequences of such a change, not by means of 
ambiguous statutory enactments adopted to deal with the hostile takeover 
phenomenon perhaps without consideration of their operation in other 
contexts. 
Other Constituencies Statues, supra, at 2253-54. 
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relationship between any non-shareholder constituency consid- 
ered and the long-term economic interests of the  shareholder^.^' 
None should be required, particularly in the case of regulated 
-- - -- -- 
75. One author has stated that after the Paramount Communications case that: 
m n  the context of reviewing decisions relating to the daily management of 
the company there is no difference between the statutes and the Delaware 
formulation of the business judgment rule. Director action in the best inter- 
est of the corporation will satisfy both the statutes and the rule; action not in 
the best interest of the corporation will satisfy neither. 
Wallman, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Placing the Corporation's Interests First, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 Bus. LAW. UPDATE, 1, 2 (Nov./Dec. 1990). The author asserts that 
the arguments opposing these other constituency statutes are largely unfounded 
because: 
First, the statutes do not say the directors can take any action they wish 
provided it benefits some stakeholder group. The statutes do say the direc- 
tors must act in the best interests of the corporation and, in so doing, may 
consider the interests of the corporation's constituencies. 
.... 
Second, the statutes (except one) are explicitly permissive. Apart from 
the traditional shareholder derivative action, they do not afford standing to 
sue to any stakeholder group. 
Third, the statutes create no "accountability" problem. . . . [Flor day- 
to-day matters, the statutes and the business judgment rule standards (at 
least after Time) essentially coincide. . . . 
Finally, as to the complaint that there has been insufficient debate, one 
can only wonder. The debate has now occurred in over half the states, has 
been the subject of law review commentary since the 1930s, and has been at 
the forefront of litigation in connection with takeovers for decades. How 
much more debate is required before legislatures are entitled to act? 
Id. 
On the other hand, Wallman argues that the benefits obtained from these statutes 
are many, being: 
First, they halt the trend toward the myopic view that the goal of corpo- 
rate governance principles is to ensure that directors maximize shareholder 
value as reflected in current stock prices. Consequently, the statutes en- 
hance the ability of directors to focus on long-term corporate strategies. 
Second, these statutes reject the principle-still embodied in Delaware 
law under Revlon-that the directors are required to engage in wealth trans- 
fers from stakeholders to shareholders in connection with the sale of the 
company. For example, in a number of transactions, shareholders have 
gained directly at the expense of bondholders, employees, and others. Bond- 
holders may now protect themselves through indenture provisions but em- 
ployees cannot. There is no merit to a mechanical legal rule that requires 
unfair wealth transfers. 
Finally, these statutes simply represent a better way of doing business. 
Our most formidable foreign competitors-Japan and Germany-have cor- 
porate cultures, laws, and governance principles embracing the corporate 
constituency concept to a greater degree than that contemplated by any of 
the state statutes. These statutes and the constituency concept they embody, 
far from being impediments to the creation of world class corporate competi- 
tors, may well be fundamental ingredients to the creation of such competi- 
tors. Even if some major institutional investors and financial press can't see 
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media corporations which control the marketplace of ideas, like 
Time, but also like CBS and NBC. 
As the examples given here show, the existing regulatory 
structure is so sparse that "public interest" under it is only a 
faint hope. But this is no reason why such a concern cannot be 
self-imposed by corporations, based upon a self-assessment of 
role in society. Corporations already wield tremendous influ- 
ence in the shaping of ideas, in defining goals and values. The 
boards of: these corporations have the latitude to adopt program- 
ming strategies that appeal to our higher, as well as our humor- 
ous, instincts. As part of their normal decisionmaking, 
corporate broadcasters should be informed of the desirability, ef- 
fects and value of programs as gleaned not just from ratings, but 
from diverse sources of information, and corporate broadcasters 
should be cognizant of not only the importance of entertaining, 
but also of the responsibility of enriching. 
this, the corporate world can. In Pennsylvania, 90% of the companies sub- 
ject to the new corporate constituency law chose to remain under the law. 
Id. 
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